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ABSTRACT 
Maintaining plural values is important when there is no conclusive principle by which 
the relative priority of normative positions can be determined. Value-articulating 
institutions predicated upon such principles have a low pluralistic potential. In 
response to the failures of stated-preference approaches to economic valuation, new 
perspectives have been developed to capture plural values. Three broad approaches 
are identified. The first, functional diversification, seeks to encompass the multiple 
qualities of the object of valuation, whereas positional modification enforces a 
particular mode of thinking on the subject. Both entail a prior judgement of values 
and benefit from a reduction in the range of values. Eventually, therefore, both 
approaches collapse pluralism to a problem that can be tackled. The third approach, 
structural reconstruction, has greater pluralistic potential, recognising that the more 
diverse and uncertain the object of valuation, the more compelling it is. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Analysts of environmental values make various assumptions about the dispositions of 
individuals who construct actual or potential moral orders for the usage of 
environmental resources. Neoclassical economists believe that individuals are 
prepared to sell the environment for the right price. Environmental valuation is then 
treated as an assessment of hedonic preference intensity as expressed in a market 
context. The contingent-valuation method (CVM), for example, assumes a 
hypothetical market in which individuals are confronted with a trade-off between a 
particular environmental good or service and money, or between various goods or 
services. This method involves direct inquiry into individuals’ willingness to pay 
(WTP) for an environmental change, or their willingness to accept compensation 
(WTA), expressed in monetary terms, for such a change.  
 
In extending market-based theory, however, this stated-preference technique has 
received persistent criticism for its narrow value ethic and poor representation of 
human psychology (Sagoff, 1988; Spash and Vatn, 2006; Gowdy, 2007; Spash, 2007; 
Spash et al., 2009; Lo, 2012). Researchers have proposed alternative valuation 
methods that recognise the plurality of environmental values and are built upon a 
range of interrelated concepts, theories or models, including multi-criteria attribute 
theory (Gregory, 2000), multi-criteria evaluation (Munda, 2006), experimental 
economics (Gowdy, 2007), social constructivism (Söderbaum, 2000; Vatn, 2009), 
post-positivism (Norton and Noonan, 2007) and discourse ethics (O’Hara, 1996).  
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Nevertheless, methods of stated-preference valuation that encompass multiple values 
do not guarantee the moral ideal of value pluralism. Value pluralism refers to the 
advocacy of maintaining a range of distinct values irreducible to each other, and is a 
normative concept, whereas value plurality is factual. Anderson (1993) defined two 
conceptions of value plurality. A ‘good’ is either something that is appropriately 
valued, or the bearer of a bundle of qualities that meet certain standards or 
requirements. From one perspective, values are plural to the extent that the goods 
under valuation are the proper objects of multiple evaluative attitudes, such as 
pleasure and respect; the opposite, monistic view allows only one sensible way of 
valuing. From the other perspective, the goods are able to meet diverse evaluative 
standards; the opposite, monistic view requires that these diverse standards be reduced 
to a single ground or explained in terms of a single good-constituting property.1  
 
It has been suggested that the importance of value pluralism is closely related to value 
incommensurability, which describes a situation in which distinct values are not 
reducible to each other or to a common measurement of value. The standard economic 
treatment fails to recognise monetary incommensurability. Many of its opponents 
have advocated the separate assessment of distinct values, or abandon the enterprise 
of monetary valuation altogether. A value-pluralistic approach, they argue, must be 
highly disaggregated and ideologically open, i.e. non-reductionistic and inclusive 
(Söderbaum, 2000). These criteria constitute a categorical test of the compatibility of 
multi-criteria appraisal techniques with pluralism (Söderbaum, 2000; Vatn, 2009). 
However, this assessment is open to question (Lo, 2011). 
                                                 
1 An anonymous reviewer suggests that the two conceptions of value plurality, i.e. multiple ways of 
valuing and multiple valued properties, correspond to the decision-science binary of 
intuitive/spontaneous/holistic vs. rational/deliberate/dissecting decisions. 
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What has gone unnoticed is that these criteria do not constitute sufficient grounds for 
consciously maintaining a variety of values. Incommensurable values are weakly 
comparable (Martinez-Alier et al., 1998). Comparison between them entails selection 
according to predefined rules that allow a particular value category to be privileged 
over other distinct values, irrespective of commensurability. As long as the analyst 
holds a conclusive definition of a normative ordering, few rather than many options 
must be maintained. A value theory that respects incommensurability but is geared to 
elicit a particular category of values does not guarantee that the whole range of values 
will be accommodated. That is, if we have identified the ‘best’ category with certainty, 
pluralism is an unnecessary ideal.  
 
Such certainty, however, seems necessary to defend an alternative to the neoclassical 
theory of value. A monistic domain faces its greatest competition from an opposite 
monistic domain, rather than from a pluralistic one that subsumes it. The sharper the 
contrast, the stronger the argument for accepting an alternative to the monistic 
economic theory of value. Internal diversity hinders the establishment of such a 
contrast. An alternative to monistic value theory is most compelling, therefore, if it is 
predicated on equally monistic arguments. The perfect alternative to the monistic 
economic theory is likely to be monism of a different sort, rather than pluralism. 
Establishing a pluralist value theory in such terms is paradoxical. 
 
The principle proposed here concerns neither the recognition of incommensurability 
nor the deployment of monetary numeraire. A normative theory of environmental 
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valuation is considered pluralistic when it is grounded in the absence of a conclusive 
principle by which the relative priority of normative positions can be determined. A 
pluralistic approach should make room for all value categories and minimise 
pre-emptive qualitative judgements of categories. An acid test is the extent to which 
the robustness of a valuation approach depends on the selection or deactivation of a 
particular value category. A valuation approach has much less pluralistic potential if 
there is stronger theoretical justification for its deployment in response to a decreasing 
range of possible evaluative attitudes or standards. Deliberate efforts to mitigate moral 
differences reduce the need to include values. 
 
This paper focuses on approaches to and concepts of monetary valuation that have 
been proposed as remedies for or alternatives to stated-preference methods of 
capturing the variety of environmental values. The next section briefly reviews the 
issue of value pluralism as a challenge to economic orthodoxy. Various emerging 
concepts and models are then discussed and categorised by weaving fragmentary 
perspectives on necessary remedies or alternatives into a more comprehensible, 
coherent discourse. The third section elaborates on the strengths and weaknesses of 
these concepts and models. The principles that underlie the proposed pluralistic 
approach are highlighted. 
 
2. OBSERVED VALUE PLURALITY  
The primary unit of neoclassical economic analysis is the individual, who is viewed as 
a utility-maximising consumer. The environment is considered to be of value when 
the individual is willing to pay for an expected utility gain derived from it. 
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Environmental value is then deemed to be dependent on the consequences of an 
action. Environmental valuation is deployed to measure the individual consumer’s 
preference, which is assumed to be complete, continuous and transitive. Within the 
neoclassical economic framework, the ideal consumer is fully aware of and able to 
express clearly his or her environmental preference.  
 
This economic model diverges from social and political constructions of 
environmental value. Concerns about the environment may pertain to the history of 
humans’ relationship with nature and the processes of natural creation (Goodin, 1992). 
For instance, a sentimental attachment to the land may emerge from the experience of 
nature’s intransigence, and exist independently of material interests (Tuan, 1974). In 
the social context, environmental values may be expressed in the form of cultural 
metaphor or social pride, thereby contributing to individual or group identity. Such 
symbolic sentiments prevent people from trading off valued environmental entities 
(Burgess et al., 1998). Environmental preferences may also connote political 
intentions. The individual may act as a citizen representing society at large and 
expressing a community-regarding commitment (Sagoff, 1988). Such a commitment 
is often couched in terms of societal norms and the moral obligation to improve social 
society. Environmental valuation is thus envisaged as a kind of judgement on the 
appropriateness of an environmental decision or action. 
 
Evidence for the above can be found in numerous CVM reports. Rights-based beliefs 
are found to be a strong predictor of WTP variations, reflecting the behavioural 
intention to defend the inviolable rights of nonhuman species irrespective of the 
consequences (Spash et al., 2009; Lo et al., 2012). Perceptions of unfair valuation 
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procedures and practices are associated with negative attitudes that lead to protest 
responses (Jorgensen and Syme, 2000). A related set of motives concerns trust. 
Blamey (1998) confirmed that distrust of institutions or scientists and the tendency to 
ascribe responsibility to other parties are negatively associated with individuals’ 
willingness to pay and the likelihood of their doing so.  
 
Furthermore, recent developments in behavioural economics have shown the 
assumption of a rational, utility-maximising and isolated economic actor to be 
untenable (Gowdy, 2007). Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) found that WTP bids are 
not quantity-sensitive, as economists expect; rather, the stated value denotes an 
intended moral contribution motivated by attitude and affection. Extrinsic intervention, 
such as monetary compensation, may ‘crowd out’ intrinsic value commitment when it 
is perceived to intrude upon the civic virtues embraced (Frey and Jegen, 2001).  
 
Although the standard economic assumptions are under persistent attack, numerous 
moral judgements and technical definitions have been applied to explain their 
limitations and propose solutions. As a result, practitioners are divided as to what 
kinds of alternatives or remedies are needed. 
 
3. THE VARIETY OF EXPERT RESPONSES 
The controversy surrounding the concept of plurality is reflected in the lack of 
consensus on its nature and proper treatment. Hardcore mainstream economists have 
dismissed deontological arguments as impractical in terms of policy impact (Pearce, 
1998) and irrelevant to economics (Milgrom, 1993). Some authors have cast doubt on 
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ontological pluralism and discredited plural values. They have rebutted arguments for 
alternative methods of valuation on the grounds that those ‘irrational’ expressions are 
not non-economic (Cooper et al., 2004), that intrinsic values are substitutable (Price, 
2000) or that the small number of protest responses does not justify the abandonment 
of cost-benefit analysis (Orr, 2007). According to these views, the evaluative capacity 
of the standard economic approach is not severely impoverished by presuming value 
commensurability.  
 
Some economists have admitted, with qualifications, the limitations of 
stated-preference approaches, yet only at a methodological level. Hanley and Shogren 
(2005) averred that the main problem with such approaches is that people’s 
preferences may deviate from the economic model. They suggested that people must 
be educated to correct their uninformed, unexamined preferences and bring them in 
line with standard economic theory. Unstable stated values are an economic problem 
that can be solved by preference construction (Powe, 2007). More sympathetic 
economists have supported economic orthodoxy and maintained that economics has 
no critical moral intent. 
 
Behavioural psychologists and decision scientists have explicitly acknowledged the 
failure of consumer-based theory. Some, like certain economists, appear reluctant to 
recognise non-economic observations as morally legitimate. Baron and Spranca (1997: 
15) argued that rights-based responses indicate a desire for a particular outcome that 
is ‘contaminated’ by some ‘imagined means’ of achieving that outcome. Such 
responses ‘might be incorrect’ because they reflect values and emotions expressed in 
the wrong way. The failure to make instrumental choices is perceived as a cognitive 
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problem arising from an individual’s inability to comprehend or reluctance to face the 
required welfare tradeoffs (Gregory et al., 1997). Value conflict is deemed reducible; 
merely a matter of technical incommensurability, which ‘refers to the issue of 
representation of multiple identities in descriptive models’ (Munda, 2006: 91). 
Members of this group of researchers have tended to understand moral differences in 
technical terms.  
 
Heterodox economists and political theorists with a greater social orientation have 
argued for the salience of moral intent on the part of the valuing agents. Value 
incommensurability is regarded as an ethical reality to be respected. As different 
values are inherently only weakly comparable, it is inappropriate to reduce everything 
to a monetary metric (Martinez-Alier et al., 1998; Vatn, 2009). Non-economic ethics 
and motivations are considered additional aspects of life to be recognised and 
protected in their entirety rather than tailored to a given economic ideal. These 
researchers have tended to espouse a more ontologically pluralistic conception of 
value.  
 
This initial characterisation of scientific treatments illustrates the range of hypotheses 
regarding the nature of value plurality. Hardcore economists favour the status quo, 
while their more sympathetic counterparts accept minimal methodological 
adjustments. Psychologists recommend crafting people’s psychology without 
attacking the moral basis of neoclassical economics, whereas social pluralists develop 
alternatives beyond the neoclassical ambit. The last two sets of epistemological 
beliefs reflect two fundamentally different approaches to evaluating complex issues. 
Central to the rational or idealised ‘economic’ approach is persuasion, which refers to 
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an internal communication process in which the individual examines each argument 
carefully and balances the pros and cons to form a well-structured attitude (Renn, 
1992). The political approach recognises values that are formed peripherally: a faster 
and less laborious strategy of forming attitudes in response to specific cues or simple 
heuristics. Although there are areas of substantial conflict between the two approaches 
(Lo, 2011), their reconciliation is seen as vital to policy-making (Dietz and Stern, 
2008; Renn, 2006). 
 
The divergence in assumptions about values leads to multiple ways of dealing with 
the issue of value plurality. This has resulted in a range of remedial measures and new 
approaches to the development of value theories and elicitation techniques. Examples 
of such measures and approaches can be grouped into three categories, which are 
explored in the following section. 
 
4. THREE REMEDIAL OR ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
Every inquiry into environmental valuation comprises three basic elements: the object 
(the valued), the subject (the valuing agent) and an evaluative framework. 
Accordingly, three alternative or remedial valuation approaches can be identified, 
namely functional diversification, positional modification and structural 
reconstruction. New or modified value-articulating frameworks often involve more 
than one of these concepts. Combinations with different emphases have produced a 
range of valuation models and techniques along the monism-pluralism continuum.  
  
Functional diversification 
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Functional diversification is justified by the view that the ability to capture the full 
range of nature’s value is constrained by nature’s inherent physical complexity. Some 
of its contributions are not readily recognisable or estimable, due to the limitations of 
human knowledge. Conventional valuation methods address the flow of tangible 
resource properties, immediate productive or consumptive benefits and short-term 
ecological changes. Abstract concepts such as biodiversity are not accounted for in 
their entirety (Meinard and Grill, 2011). As a result, conventional valuation methods 
fail to encompass the entire range of dynamic and intangible ecological properties, 
notably the irreversibility and resilience of ecosystems and the interdependency of 
ecological functions and values (Barbier et al., 1994; Chavas, 2000). As such primary 
or ‘glue’ values are not included in the calculation of total economic value, 
aggregating the value ascribed to each of a given ecosystem’s functions fails to 
account for the multiple values generated by that ecosystem (Turner et al., 2003). In a 
primitive form, this critique of conventional valuation methods could lead to a 
qualified defence of Pearce’s (1998) dictum ‘demonstration and capture’. According 
to this view, the success of a value inquiry depends on the extent to which an 
ecosystem’s ‘true’ state is comprehensively and objectively captured.  
 
Of prime importance is a comprehensive informational grounding. Within the 
standardised framework established by de Groot et al. (2002: 394), the ‘first step’ 
towards the valuation of ecosystems ‘involves the translation of ecological complexity 
(structures and processes) into a more limited number of ecosystems functions’. De 
Groot et al. (2002: 393) proposed that identifying and defining ‘the fullest possible 
range of 23 ecosystem functions’ can ‘make comparative ecological economic 
analysis possible’. The development of this framework contributed to the literature on 
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ecosystems valuation not by diversifying evaluative perspectives but by combining 
them with ‘a comprehensive data base of ecosystem services and values’ (de Groot et 
al., 2002: 407). Central to this approach are an objective, factual basis for analysis and 
a broad definition of ecological goods or services.  
 
Functional relationships are a key element of Lockwood’s (1997) ‘integrated value 
theory’. This theory concerns the functional and instrumental relationships between 
three classes of end-valuable entities, namely human beings, non-self-aware 
biological organisms and the inorganic components of ecosystems. These entities and 
their functional relationships give meaning to the various modes of value expression 
and provide a basis for ‘moral considerability’. The non-economic values ascribed to 
natural areas are then justified theoretically in functional terms. Lockwood (1997) 
argued that value assessment can be advanced by an explicit recognition of such 
functional realities and interdependencies.  
 
The above approach constitutes a weak form of pluralist theory that defines the range 
of values primarily in terms of the object of valuation. It concerns value multiplicity, a 
concept that emphasises the multi-faceted nature of the contributions made by the 
items valued. Proponents of this approach have argued that the primary problem 
facing economic valuation is that certain critical qualities of ecological goods or 
services are unvalued by and omitted from conventional treatments. The objective of 
functional diversification is to ensure a more dimensionally comprehensive 
assessment by re-incorporating such unvalued or missing components and 
encompassing a wider range of the functional attributes or good-constituting 
properties of the valued items, including less visible attributes and properties such as 
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an ecosystem’s resilient capacity and the ecological role of a species across food 
chains. Acts of valuing are understood as exercises in accounting for certain objective 
realities – ‘valuing the characteristics of a system’ (Barbier et al., 1994: 119). This 
account is generally in accord with Anderson’s (1993) secondary conception of value 
plurality. 
 
The functional-diversification approach emphasises the importance of informing 
valuing agents of the correct aspects of the items to be assessed. A common 
methodological recommendation is to improve the ways in which information about 
the effects of a given environmental change is communicated, and the quality of the 
information itself. Turner et al. (2010: 79) attempted to ‘identify a place for monetary 
valuation within the pluralistic approach’. The challenges to economic valuation 
identified in this study derive from underestimating the properties of biophysical 
structures and processes, including spatial explicitness, nonlinearities in benefits and 
threshold effects. One of the suggestions made by Turner et al. (2010) for recognising 
value plurality involves a ‘scoping exercise’ that employs ‘spatially explicit models of 
any given ecosystem service’ (ibid.: 81) and may benefit from the use of a 
geographical information system (GIS), which is regarded as ‘a valuable tool in 
valuation’ (ibid.: 91). The general remedial strategy proposed, called a ‘sequential 
decision support system’ (ibid.: 83), has no explicit social or moral components; 
instead, it emphasises the need to improve knowledge and understanding of the 
complexities and interrelationships of ecosystems. 
 
Positional modification 
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The methodological focus of positional-modification approaches is the individual. 
The key is to include the right people or to introduce the right principles by which 
ecological goods or services are evaluated. The standard economic approach is 
deemed to be flawed as it makes unrealistic assumptions about the motivation and 
competence of the valuing agents. The constituency adopted in this approach is 
considered by positional-modification advocates to be morally improper and/or 
cognitively incapable of performing the required evaluation. Two groups of advocates 
can be identified according to the relative importance given to these two elements.  
 
For authors who stress the lack of cognitive ability exhibited by valuing agents, the 
failures of stated-preference approaches rest more on the valuing agents than on the 
economists who use these techniques. Gregory (2000) argued that individuals often 
fail to articulate their values effectively in the absence of systematic decision aids. 
The operational objective of his ‘value integration survey’ is to activate the consumer 
mode of thinking during environmental-valuation tasks. Consumer sovereignty is 
reflected in his instructions for the survey, which encourage participants to consider 
the decision to purchase a car as an analogy (Gregory, 2000: 160). The process is ‘a 
kind of tutorial’ (Gregory et al., 1993: 179) and the analyst functions as an ‘architect’ 
(Gregory and Slovic, 1997: 177). Lienhoop and MacMillan (2007: 213–214) proposed 
a ‘Market Stall’ approach grounded in the belief that ‘[t]he interaction with other 
people presents an environment that seems to better meet the needs of consumers’. A 
more radical treatment involves replacing lay people with experts. Mann (2004) 
advanced a technique known as the ‘Expert Valuation Method’ (EVM) as an 
alternative to the CVM. According to proponents of the EVM, the ‘right’ valuing 
agents are not consumers but scientists or local experts with ‘considerable practical 
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experience’, who are thus better equipped to understand and assess the scientific 
implications of the ecological goods or services under valuation. The EVM is 
designed to specify and reinforce a subjective scope or frame of reference for the 
evaluation required. 
 
According to other authors, the failures of stated-preference approaches have more to 
do with economists. Such authors are more concerned about ethics and criticise the 
conventional economic approach for unduly assuming that individuals are necessarily 
utility-maximising. Acts of valuing are envisaged as social acts with social meanings 
(O’Neill and Spash, 2000). Variation in public attitudes gives rise to value plurality. 
This account resembles Anderson’s (1993) primary conception of value plurality. The 
aim of this type of positional modification is qualitative: to transform one kind of 
evaluative attitude into another, ‘correct’ one. Alternative ways of value expression 
are introduced by activating or inhibiting certain personal or group characteristics or 
attitudes. In practice, this is achieved by experimentally controlling or selecting either 
the subjects of inquiry or the valuing agents to ensure compatibility with the 
communal nature of the environment. To address the non-exclusivity of the use of 
environmental resources, the modification typically involves a shift in evaluative 
standpoint from private to public interest, and from individual to social rationality. It 
is used as a demarcation strategy to cope with the value-incommensurability problem. 
According to Martínez-Espiñeira (2006: 194), the problem of ‘aggregating apples and 
oranges’ – an analogy for the incommensurability problem – can be avoided by 
ensuring that ‘all respondents [adopt] the same point of view (as citizens rather than 
consumers)’. The intrinsic nature and irreducibility of the value of natural wealth have 
encouraged the sceptical view that the economic realm and the utilitarian conception 
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of value are irrelevant to the social modes of environmental valuation (Douai, 2009). 
Like the authors who emphasise the failings of the valuing agents, these authors 
specify a subjective scope for valuation, albeit towards a different end. 
 
The above-described critics of economic orthodoxy tend to advocate an impartial 
stance. Brown (1984: 237) argued that ‘[t]he appropriateness of an assigned value for 
use in a resource allocation decision depends on the degree to which its use in the 
decision enhances the resource owner’s welfare’. According to Brown, the value 
should be determined in a way that takes into consideration the welfare of those who 
actually own the resource under valuation, or are entitled to its benefits. This suggests 
that relevance or legitimacy depends on who is carrying out the valuation, or for 
whom it is subject to valuation. Brown (1984: 245) recommended extending Rawls’s 
(1971) ideal of a ‘veil of ignorance’, realised by inhibiting private interests, to all 
public-resource decisions, including environmental valuation.  
 
Drawing on Rawls’s theory of justice, Costanza (2000) emphasised ‘fairness-based 
values’ that can be elicited by encouraging individuals to think as members of a 
community rather than as individuals. Brown et al. (1995: 258–259) expected each 
deliberating individual ‘to act as society’s representative’, and recommended that 
individuals with a ‘compelling personal interest’ should be excluded from the 
deliberation. This advice was echoed by Sagoff (1998: 221), who suggested that 
individuals ‘might be asked to deliberate not so much about the welfare effect of an 
environmental policy on them individually’ but on society as a whole. This 
citizen-based framework was experimentally tested by Martínez-Espiñeira (2006), 
whose respondents were asked to state their WTP on behalf of society. The strategy 
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was to modify the subjective position from which the valuing agents considered the 
environmental change in question. 
 
Functional diversification and positional modification deal with the object and subject 
of evaluation, respectively, and complement each other. Combining these approaches 
may require a reconfiguration of the structure of value articulation with particular 
attention to the evaluative framework. 
 
Structural reconstruction 
Structural reconstruction involves a fundamental change in the micro-political 
structure of the institutions in which values are articulated. Advocates of this strategy 
have emphasised the failure of the standard economic approach to allow effective 
reflection on a variety of values. They argue that particular restrictions on the norms 
and terms of people’s interactions with the environment have begun to compromise 
valuing agents’ creativity and critical competence. The aim of structural 
reconstruction is to emancipate value formation and expression at a micro-political 
level. It enables individuals participating in a valuation process to deliberate on and 
pursue their own forms of valuing. Key to this strategy is situating the actual 
valuation processes, as well as the theoretical activities of the analyst, within a 
non-coercive, interactive and egalitarian dialogue from which alternative ethical 
standards and assessment criteria are not deliberately excluded. Rather than 
specifying a value category to pursue, such pluralistic theories ‘do not attempt to 
enforce a universal vocabulary upon the discourse of environmental value’ (Norton 
and Noonan, 2007: 66). 
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The above approach explicitly acknowledges the notion of the ‘value of diversity’ 
(O’Connor, 2000). Acts of valuing are construed not only as expressions of attitudes, 
but as the outcomes of critical encounters with competing perspectives or criteria, 
leading in turn to a value judgement. A key assumption is that public value is formed 
within processes of social interaction, and does not exist prior to these interactions 
(Pritchard et al., 2000). The potential of preference transformation is increased, but it 
is sought not from external ideals. Structural reconstruction is reconstructive in the 
sense that it concerns the various competencies of individuals and norms of 
interactions, and the categories of opinions and expressions are assumed to be 
contingent upon the operant dispositions of the valuing agents rather than being 
specified by the analyst (Dryzek and Berejikian, 1993). The appropriateness of an 
assigned value depends on the extent to which the processes of assembling and 
articulating preferences are procedurally fair and capable of supporting individuals ‘in 
expressing their values in ways they find to be sound’ (Spash and Vatn, 2006: 387), 
based on their own language and criteria for assessment. The definition of ‘value’ and 
the terms of its articulation both remain reasonably open. No assumption is made 
before the inquiry as to what kinds of values will be found (Norton and Noonan, 
2007). The search for public value embraces the deontological ethic but does not 
attempt to marginalise utilitarian calculations (Martinez-Alier et al., 1998; Spash, 
2007).  
 
A more critical stance has been taken towards preoccupations held by the analyst. An 
example is ‘discourse-based valuation’, which is proposed as an application of the 
concept of discursive ethics to ecosystems valuation (O’Hara, 1996). Discursive 
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ethics concerns authentic communication among individuals, presupposes no norms 
other than practical reason and prioritises the ethical qualities of mutual recognition 
and acceptance (Dryzek, 1990). The concept entails not only a reconstruction of the 
dispersed ‘lifeworld’, but a deconstruction of established hierarchies. Conventional 
scientific rationality has contributed to coercive professionalism and hegemony by 
erecting formidable barriers to change. The ability of humankind to deal with 
ecological uncertainties and their social implications entails a decent degree of 
reflexive potential. In demanding that the conventional technocratic, exclusive 
valuation methodology be democratised, the proponents of discourse-based valuation 
seek to minimise the institutional rigidity that may compromise the openness of 
ecosystems valuation. The frame of reference for this value theory is obtained from 
within the discourse rather than being imposed by an external source. The role of the 
analyst is thus restricted. 
 
In this light, Lo (2013) and Lo and Spash (2013) suggest that deliberative monetary 
valuation should involve an inquiry into meaning and the pursuit of mutual agreement 
on economic contributions at a societal or individual level. It should aim to secure a 
socially informed exploration of the alternative meanings to be conferred on the 
monetary value assigned. The meaning and categories of ‘WTP’ arise from within the 
interaction between the valuing agents, before an explanation is given of the monetary 
value they assign. As a result, environmental valuation is no longer necessarily an 
economic assessment; it is a political-economic activity responsible for approving 
appropriate payments for an ecosystem’s goods and services.  
 
The key features of the three approaches are summarised in Table 1. Although the 
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merits of functional diversification and positional modification have been widely 
acknowledged in the literature, it is argued in the next section that structural 
reconstruction is a necessary condition for value pluralism.  
 
5. INCOMPATIBILITIES WITH VALUE PLURALISM 
Valuation methodologies are value-laden (O’Hara, 1996; Söderbaum, 2000). An 
important question concerns the extent to which this compromises the capacity for 
capturing plural values. Problems arise when the merits of the institutions responsible 
for articulating these values depend upon some degree of value convergence. The 
strategies of functional diversification and positional modification either remain 
indifferent to or seek to inhibit actual value conflict, and operate within a given 
institution geared to a particular moral domain. As a result, they risk prematurely 
closing down the critical examination of preferences and values. 
 
Conflict avoidance 
Public value is derived from collective life. Its social qualities emanate from the 
interactive processes of communication; from encounters between individuals; from 
conflicts of interests, ideas and experiences; and from reciprocal learning. All of these 
processes are influenced by social norms, rules and institutional constraints 
(O’Connor, 2000). Value statements are meanings conferred according to people’s 
appreciation of the good and their dissatisfaction with the bad. Their perceived 
alternatives and normative constraints are shaped by personal response and 
circumstance, contributing to the discourse within which people make sense of the 
world through encounters with other subjective positions in the collective sphere. The 
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formation of public value is thus a conflict-ridden process. If public value is 
understood as an intended action, it is a kind of inter-action between the 
homogeneous views internal to a discourse and external heterogeneous views. Public 
goods are commonly owned and shared among society’s members, such that any 
single action directed at them is just one integral part of a collective whole. This 
interactive dynamic cements and gives meaning to the whole; the mere aggregation of 
individual values or actions is not sufficient to provide mutually reinforcing 
integration. Just as a social action is always a response to another action or inaction, 
public value is the coexistence of alternative or rival particulars in coherent mutual 
dependence. In other words, ‘an environmental value requires its antithesis for 
definition’ (Tuan, 1974: 102).  
 
A defensible approach to the valuation of public goods requires a social context 
(Spash and Vatn, 2006; Vatn, 2009). It should be designed as an evaluation activity 
that allows diverse perspectives to interact. Functional diversification advances the 
science of valuation by promoting individual rationalisation supported by 
comprehensive information; it does not assist in social construction by exposing 
differences. For instance, de Groot et al. (2002) ascribed environmental values only to 
various ecosystem contributions. Their framework omits the mediating role of social 
norms operating at the interpersonal level. Such a valuation exercise does not take 
into account the level of actual social learning and the extent to which the valuing 
agents are socially informed. Similarly, positional modification does not require an 
authentic social setting for preference construction, although it recognises the roles of 
social construction and social norms. Sagoff (1998) supported the separation of 
citizens’ values from consumers’ values, and the creation thereby of a homogenous 
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group of valuing agents free from the reality of value disagreements that characterises 
plural societies. Preferences are transformed in a controlled social setting in which 
alternative discourses are inhibited. Such transformation involves merely the social 
construction of a singular value. 
 
Neither functional diversification nor positional modification accommodate the 
diverse relationships between and competing viewpoints held by valuing agents. 
Individuals are not required to explain why they hold a particular set of value 
judgements or assessment criteria to others to whom the evaluation results apply. That 
is, they are under no obligation to justify their personal decisions concerning common 
goods, despite the fact that these decisions will have collective consequences. The 
problem of ‘who evaluates’ (O’Hara, 1999) is inadequately addressed. This is likely to 
impede the development of mutual respect and recognition that is pivotal to the 
coexistence of different values in pluralistic societies.  
 
Structural reconstruction includes interactive elements. Positive social relations are 
often capable of bridging and harmonising diverse values and interests. Such bridging 
values are as significant as the functional values emanating from good-constituting 
properties and personally held values, as they play a coordinating role in the 
cultivation of the values ascribed to public goods, which is broadly understood as a 
dynamic process. Such bridging values thus qualify as a legitimate contributing factor 
in valuation.  
 
Furthermore, individuals need a direct response from the natural world or its human 
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representatives at an equal communicative level, rather than within anthropocentric 
and self-selective institutions such as markets, on which human impact may not be 
identifiable (Dryzek, 1995). However, nature cannot respond directly to human 
actions in socially meaningful ways. Human beings rely on the responses of ‘social 
others’ to validate their actions towards the environment. The identities and 
perspectives of these social others are less important than the opportunities for mutual 
validation that occur during encounters with people from other ‘worlds’. This 
emphasis on human interaction may still be considered unfair, as its assumptions do 
not apply to the non-human world. Nevertheless, approaches that prioritise human 
interaction are fairer than the non-interactive type, because they allow social 
validation – including conflict and rejection – to take place in an authentic interactive 
setting rather than within one’s own mind, which is more likely to be constrained by 
individual circumstances. Although the norms of social interaction may discourage 
the expression of individual interests, this does not severely threaten the preservation 
of pluralism as long as the discouragement is not enacted coercively by an external 
party. In this sense, the ‘publicness’ of environmental value is conferred not by its 
constituent parts, but by the democratic legitimacy of the value-articulating institution 
involved. 
 
Embedded judgements 
Value-articulating institutions play a normative role by predefining the relevance, 
validity or legitimacy of values. This creates embedded judgements whose 
self-reinforcement may constitute the greatest impediment to the enterprise of 
pluralism. Functional-diversification and positional-modification approaches either 
effect changes within existing value-articulating institutions or propose new 
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institutions geared to desired outcomes. This is ambivalent, as the method of 
addressing value pluralism is specified in accordance with a particular set of end 
values defined in terms independent of the dynamic of value formation. The success 
of such approaches depends on the attainment or otherwise of the desired moral end.  
 
This resembles a problem raised by Goodin (1992), who argued that the Green 
theories of value and agency are logically separate: while the former are ecocentric, 
the latter operate first and foremost at the level of individual human agents. He 
contended that the viability of political agency is determined by the extent to which 
human interest is satisfied, but that this is not the case for the process-based Green 
values. Logically as well as causally, individual human agency comes first (Goodin, 
1992). Therefore, any Green theory of values that regards the prevailing political 
agency as essentially unproblematic is indefensible (Dryzek, 2000). Goodin argued 
that it is unproductive to internalise ecocentric perspectives and imperatives without 
adopting Green methods of reforming political structures and processes accordingly. 
 
Economic theories can be regarded as a specific form of institution and hence a theory 
of political agency. Functional-diversification approaches are indifferent to the kinds 
of institutions by which Green values are enfranchised and relevant actions are 
determined. Only the source and content of the information supplied are diversified. 
Separating value from agency favours the status quo, as human agency is currently 
protected and legitimised as a matter of vested interest. As a result, functional 
diversification works well with conventional forms of valuation survey. Using the 
framework established by de Groot et al. (2002), for example, all of the types of 
values generated by defined ecosystem functions are said to be compatible with at 
 25 
least one standard economic technique. Similarly, Meinard and Grill (2011) sought to 
‘improve standard valuation methods’, and Turner et al. (2010: 79) expressed a 
preference for cost-benefit analysis that has been ‘suitably adjusted for equity 
concerns’. The value-articulating institutions adopted remain inherently 
anthropocentric, and their outcomes are necessarily economic constructs, regardless 
of their perceived functional diversity. Redefining values only implies or concedes 
that the existing institutions are either environmentally benign or unproblematic. 
Despite its openness to the multiplicity of values, this method of inquiry may come to 
resemble a monist treatment, as values are eventually adapted to economic standards. 
Consequently only isolated successes under green capitalism could be achieved. A 
value theory that is indifferent to institutions risks being wrested to serve the 
preoccupations of the theorist. Functional diversification alone is too passive an 
approach to specify the objects of valuation. 
 
Positional-modification approaches confront the same problem, albeit to a lesser 
extent. Adopting an alternative evaluative attitude does not guarantee pluralistic 
articulation. The activation of a particular mode of evaluative attitude requires a 
controlled setting that privileges a particular constituency. The favoured evaluative 
attitude is most salient when its alternatives are deactivated. The success of positional 
modification thus depends on polarisation. Institutions that foster a citizen-oriented 
mode of thinking tend to inhibit the consumer mode or deny its relevance. This 
provides an incentive to make monistic claims. Citizen-value theorists are tempted to 
attack the consumer theory to establish their own theoretical frameworks. The smaller 
the diversity of values embraced by a theory, the stronger the case for its uniqueness 
and differentiation from its competitors. As this theory depends on the strength of a 
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particular position, it may benefit from a narrowing of scope. Eventually, therefore, it 
risks becoming an anti-economic theory with limited pluralistic potential.  
 
Moreover, positional modification relies on the analyst’s judgement of the relevance, 
validity or legitimacy of various value positions. The solution to the problem of 
‘aggregating apples and oranges’ (incommensurability) is to make the choice on 
behalf of the valuing agents; asking them all to adopt the citizen mode, for example. 
The valuing agents are thus construed as merely reacting agents, and are not expected 
to contest the imposed frame, leaving little reflexive potential on the part of the 
analyst. Changing the subject’s ways of valuing according to the analyst’s preference 
is not a democratic evaluation practice that can be defended in terms of pluralism. In 
sum, positional modification alone is too active an approach to pre-empt a subjective 
scope for evaluation. 
 
The aim of structural reconstruction is to reformulate value theory as well as agency 
theory. For proponents of this framework, diversifying value inputs is not sufficient; 
the ultimate barrier is understood to lie in the analyst’s preconceptions. Egalitarian 
communication is practised at two levels: by valuing agents and by value theorists. 
The theoretical foundations on which a value-articulating institution is built must be 
pluralistic, and the procedures by which it is produced must not privilege any 
particular qualities of values. ‘Categorically charged’ institutions are self-reinforcing: 
the more alternative value categories they inhibit, the more successful they are. 
Practically, it is impossible to include all types of values; a more fruitful method is to 
reject institutions that actively exclude any values. Structural theories capture plural 
values by deconstructing any and all hierarchies. 
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The above discussion suggests that the mere recognition of value incommensurability 
is not a sufficient condition for pluralistic value theory. Technical incommensurability 
is implied by functional diversification, and in some cases by positional modification, 
while moral incommensurability underscores the more socially oriented approach of 
positional modification. However, neither of these approaches recognise the absence 
of conclusive value criteria. The institutions they prioritise are ‘categorically charged’, 
implying a prior selection of value categories that typically depends on the choice 
between citizen and consumer mode, and between a utilitarian and a non-utilitarian 
ethic. Value plurality is acknowledged, but so is value hierarchy. The strongly 
pluralistic intent of each of these approaches thus becomes a barrier. 
 
A normative value theory committed to known moral ends is far from pluralistic. The 
importance of a pluralistic institution should be negatively related to its ability to 
prioritise one value category over its alternatives. Morally as well as logically, a 
particular categorical preference is not a sustainable justification for a pluralistic 
institution. The case for functional diversification or positional modification is 
grounded in such a commitment. Douai (2009: 274) claimed that modes of 
environmental valuation never relate to the economic realm. In contrast, it is argued in 
this paper that no pluralistic value theory is justifiable on exclusively economic or 
anti-economic grounds. 
  
 
6. CONCLUSION 
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Attempts to capture plural values are classified at three conceptual levels. Functional 
diversification involves changes to the substance of valuation. The methodological 
scope of this approach is wide, and it accommodates appropriate functional 
considerations. Effective functional-diversification techniques recognise the 
multi-dimensional properties of nature and propose remedial policy options. As this 
approach does not challenge the normative nature and structure of value-articulating 
institutions, the status quo, i.e. consumer sovereignty and a utilitarian model, is 
protected. Positional transformation entails changes to constituency. Diverse 
perspectives, expertise and experiences are embraced within a particular moral scope. 
The valuing agents are encouraged or selected to speak for the same constituency. 
Neither approach challenges the built-in moral judgements of existing 
value-articulating institutions. This creates a set of rules of inclusion or exclusion that 
do not allow individuals to embrace alternative criteria beyond the specified 
institutional boundaries. In short, any moral claim with which the analyst disagrees 
does not count.  
 
Using these approaches, the case for pluralism is not defensible. Underlying the 
notion of value pluralism are the reality of value conflict and the lack of a conclusive 
principle by which the relative priority of normative positions can be determined. 
Value-articulating institutions dedicated to attaining or foreclosing a particular moral 
outcome are counteractive. What is required to change, according to some defined 
criteria theoretically justified as appropriate, is the scope, attitude or mode of 
valuation undertaken by the valuing agents. The favoured ethical imperatives are 
treated as constants, whereas individual preferences are assumed to vary. Some 
authors express confidence in the existing economic institutions, whereas others 
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propose alternative approaches in competition with conventional economic 
philosophy. However, all of the proponents of these approaches advance new value 
theories as means to desired moral outcomes, and all make conclusive judgements on 
values.  
 
Building a pluralistic institution upon any one pole of a dichotomy is doomed to 
failure, because such an institution may subsequently benefit from monistic 
approaches that differentiate it from its alternatives. Nevertheless, this is the current 
approach by which value multiplicity is recognised and instituted; ironically, it 
eventually places a smaller group of values at an advantage. The sufficient condition 
for pluralism is not only the ability to recognise multiplicity and difference, but the 
inability to make conclusive choices among the differing many. The ability to 
prioritise one category satisfies the basic requirement of a monistic institution, 
irrespective of how many categories and how much diversity are identified.  
 
A theoretically consistent theory of plural values affirms the need to provide 
opportunities for alternatives to an established position to make compelling cases. 
Hardly any pluralistic programme would be defensible if the established were not 
refutable and its alternatives were unable to gain acceptance as grounds for action. A 
commitment to ‘agreeing to disagree’ is essential.  
 
Normative value theory at the third level seems more appealing. Structural 
reconstruction democratises the ways in which values are assessed and theorised. The 
nature of the monetary values ascribed by the valuing agents is explicitly determined 
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by the agents themselves, rather than specified by the analyst. Of importance to this 
exploration is the involvement of authentic subjective value profiles, which allow 
conflict to take place between various real discourses surrounding public decisions 
about the environment. Therefore, a pluralistic-valuation approach is one that does not 
deliberately restrict the access of the affected or interested parties, and which involves 
a structurally pluralistic value-articulating institution, such that the analyst’s 
preoccupations with an ideal outcome are rendered transparent and given no 
advantage, or at least made remediable. Such an approach assumes that the conferred 
meaning and category of a stated value are contingent; they must be sought in the 
language of the valuing agents, and are not arbitrarily predetermined by the 
theoretical framework. This kind of monetary valuation is topical and not theoretical; 
although it inevitably concerns money and values, it accommodates a wide range of 
possible theoretical approaches, perspectives and explanations (Lo and Spash, 2013). 
 
Incorporating critical elements into existing institutions appears to be a challenging 
task for environmental managers and practitioners seeking practical solutions. 
Concerns about manageability have limited the political attractiveness of structurally 
reconstructive institutions. Consequently, monotonic value-articulating strategies 
continue to be preferred. Although ensuring the non-exclusion of distinctive values 
may be an effective strategy for reducing the gap between current institutions and 
value systems, (selective) inclusion seems to be a more manageable approach. This 
reflects the uniqueness of structural reconstruction while explaining its slow adoption 
at the institutional level. 
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Table 1 Key conceptual elements of the three pluralistic valuation approaches 
 Functional 
Diversification 
Positional 
Modification 
Structural 
Reconstruction 
Ontology Substance (object 
of valuation) 
Constituency 
(subject of 
valuation) 
Institution 
(evaluative 
framework) 
Justification Complexity of 
object 
Complexity of 
object/value 
incommensu 
-rability 
Value of 
diversity/value 
incommensu- 
rability 
Site of Variation Good-constituting 
properties 
Subjective scope of 
valuation 
Theory of value 
and valuation 
Definition of Value 
Category 
Given Given Open 
Required 
Institutional 
Capacity 
Informative 
potential 
Transformative 
potential 
Reflexive potential 
Learning Model  Information deficit Focused reasoning 
and enlightenment 
Critical interaction 
(extending to 
researcher) 
Practical Strategy Supply information 
of better quality 
Activate 
appropriate 
perspective 
Juxtapose 
conflicting values 
or criteria  
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Expected Outcome Multi-dimensional 
understanding 
Construction of 
defined values 
Reconstruction of 
values 
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